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Abstract. We present a method to search for a probe (or query) image
representation against a large gallery in the encrypted domain. We require
that the probe and gallery images be represented in terms of a fixed
length representation, which is typical for representations obtained from
learned networks. Our encryption scheme is agnostic to how the fixed
length representation is obtained and can therefore be applied to any fixed
length representation in any application domain. Our method, dubbed
HERS (Homomorphically Encrypted Representation Search), operates
by: (i) compressing the representation towards its estimated intrinsic
dimensionality, (ii) encrypting the compressed representation using the
proposed fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and (iii) searching against
a gallery of encrypted representations directly in the encrypted domain,
without decrypting them, and with minimal loss of accuracy. Numerical
results on large galleries of face, fingerprint, and object datasets such as
ImageNet show that, for the first time, accurate and fast image search
within the encrypted domain is feasible at scale (296 seconds; 46× speed
up over state-of-the-art for face search against a background of 1 million).
Keywords: Fixed-Length Representation, Dimensionality Reduction,
Intrinsic Dimensionality, Homomorphic Encryption, Privacy-Preserving
Search
1 Introduction
In 2014, a hack on the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) left 22 million
user records exposed, including millions of fingerprint records. Data breaches,
like the OPM hack, could have untold consequences against those whose personal
identifiable information (PII 1) was compromised, including identity theft, robbery,
unauthorized access to secure facilities, and blackmail. Sadly, in today’s day and
age, data-breaches like these are not isolated incidents 2 3 4, motivating and
necessitating the development of strong encryption techniques which protect the
underlying data at all times.
Perhaps the most vulnerable category of stored data still needing adequate
protection is that of image representations (e.g. face representations). While
many forms of data can be sufficiently secured in a database with a well-known
1
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Fig. 1: Overview: Unencrypted and Encrypted face image search systems. Given an
image representation (template), it is either (i) stored in a database (enrollment) or (ii)
passed to the matcher for searching. Both the database and the matcher are potential
points of attack. An attacker can either steal a template directly from an unencrypted
database, launching an impersonation attack. Or, if the database were AES encrypted,
the hacker could attack the matcher where templates are decrypted for comparison. In
our approach, (i) the templates are encrypted during database enrollment and (ii) the
templates are matched within the encrypted domain. As such, a hacker is unable to
exploit any meaningful information from stolen templates.
encryption scheme like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [18], image
representations present a unique challenge. In particular, query image represen-
tations are often searched against other representations already enrolled in the
database (e.g. a face search system). Even if the enrolled representations were
protected with AES, they would have to be decrypted prior to matching with a
query representation, leaving both of them vulnerable at the point of compar-
ison (Fig. 1). As such, it is critically important to develop strong encryption
techniques to protect image representations in the database and during matching.
While much research continues in the area of improving the discriminative
power of image representations (e.g. face recognition [56,42] and image classifica-
tion [40]), relatively little effort has been invested into ensuring the security of the
representations after they have been learned. This is alarming considering deep
face representations can be (i) reconstructed back into their corresponding face
image (Fig. 1) [29] or (ii) violate user privacy by mining demographic attributes
such as age, ethnicity, or gender [27]. More generally, it is well known that local
features, such as deep CNN representations [10], SIFT [55,36], HOG [53] and
Bag-of-Visual-Words [21], can be inverted back into the image space with high
fidelity.
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1.1 Homomorphic Encryption
A special class of encryption algorithms which enable basic arithmetic opera-
tions (multiplications and/or additions) in the encrypted domain are known
as homomorphic encryption (HE) systems [16]. Since representations extracted
by CNNs are typically compared using simple distance metrics like euclidean
distance or cosine similarity, HE systems are a plausible solution to protect
the representations within the database, and also during matching. It is worth
noting that HE systems also satisfy other major requirements of feature matching
systems [30], including diversity, revocability, security, performance, and
privacy.
The barrier against using HE schemes “off-the-shelf” [13] for protection of
image representations is the computational complexity of arithmetic operations
directly on the ciphertext (in the encrypted domain). This is especially true of
fully-homomorphic encryption schemes (FHE) which enable both additions and
multiplications within the encrypted domain [13]. For example, the authors in [49]
showed that a naive implementation of FHE requires 48.7 MB of memory and 12.8
seconds to match a single pair of 512-dimensional encrypted face representations.
Such computational requirements restrict the application of FHE schemes in 1 : 1
matching applications and completely render them impractical in 1 : m search
applications at scale.
To overcome these limitations, we present a practical solution, dubbed HERS,
for 1 : m encrypted feature matching at scale. This is achieved through a
synergistic combination of dimensionality reduction of features and development
of a more efficient FHE scheme.
1.2 Contributions
– A data encoding scheme that is tailored for efficient 1 : m representation
matching in the encrypted domain by leveraging SIMD5 capabilities of existing
FHE schemes. Over a gallery of 1 Million 512-dim templates, this provides
an 11× speed-up.
– A dimensionality reduction scheme, dubbed DeepMDS++, based on Deep-
MDS [17], a state-of-the-art dimensionality reduction technique. For a 1,536-
dim ImageNet representation from Inception-Resnet, this provides a 24×
speed-up at a 1% loss in Average Precision for image retrieval.
– Extensive experimental analysis (face, fingerprint, and ImageNet datasets) in
terms of accuracy, latency and memory requirements when performing image
search in the encrypted domain. Our results indicate that HERS is the first
scheme capable of delivering accurate (within ≈ 2% of unencrypted accuracy)
and real-time (within 5 minutes) image search in the encrypted domain at
scale (1 million gallery). The overall scheme provides a 46× speed-up over a
state-of-the-art 1 : 1 matching of 128-dim encrypted feature vectors.
5 Single Instruction Multiple Data
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2 Related Work
Privacy-Preserving Representations: Methods to secure representations of
personally identifying information have been developed over the past decade.
These are summarized in [5] into two categories: (i) cryptographic protection, and
(ii) pattern recognition based protection. Visual cryptography [32] is a common
cryptographic approach for securing biometric data such as fingerprint [45]
and face [39] images. Under some schemes, the visual perturbations need to
be removed prior to performing a match, exposing the biometric data during
authentication or search. Fuzzy-vaults [19] are another cryptosystem which have
been utilized for fingerprint [50] and iris [26] recognition. Pattern recognition
based protection schemes have been proposed as an alternative to cryptosystems.
Examples include non-invertible transformation functions [37] and cancelable
biometrics [35]. Additionally, key-binding systems have been proposed to merge
a biometric template with a secret key [6,31]. All of these approaches trade-off
matching performance for security of the template. In contrast, HERS does not
suffer from this trade-off i.e., it provides high levels of representation security
with minimal loss in matching accuracy.
Encrypted Distance Computation: Homomorphic encryption (HE) cryp-
tosystems enable arithmetic directly on ciphertext, and as such can be leveraged
to compute distances between feature vectors entirely in the encrypted domain.
However, given the extreme computational complexity of HE [16] most existing
works utilizing HE are limited to binary templates and partial homomorphic
encryption (PHE) (supports either encrypted additions or encrypted multipli-
cations) [4,25]. A few recent works have have demonstrated the use of Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes [13] (supports encrypted multipli-
cations and additions). Cheon et al. [7] and Boddeti [5] proposed FHE based
schemes which leverage a batching technique to reduce the memory and compu-
tational requirements for 1 : 1 matching of binary iris (Hamming distance) and
quantized face representations (cosine distance), respectively, in the encrypted
domain. Boddeti showed that two 512-dimensional face representations could
be compared with 16 KB of memory and in 2.5 milliseconds. Engelsma et al.
[11] adopted the same scheme for 1 : 1 matching of 192-dimensional encrypted
fingerprint representations in 1.25 milliseconds. In contrast, early FHE schemes
for the same took 100 seconds per match [5].
Although these algorithmic savings enable using FHE for 1 : 1 matching
applications, the time and space complexity remains intractable for most 1 : m
matching applications (image search). For example, encrypted search against
a m = 1, 000, 000 gallery representations that are of dimensionality 512 would
still take over 230 minutes and 90GB memory with the improved FHE scheme
proposed in [5]. As such, in this work we develop a FHE based solution that is
explicitly designed for efficient 1 : m encrypted matching and can be applied to
any image search application.
Privacy-Preserving Visual Recognition: Within the broader context of
computer vision there is growing interest in privacy-preserving techniques. These
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Fig. 2: Schematic Diagram of HERS . First, we estimate the intrinsic dimensionality of
a given representation [17] in an offline stage from a gallery p1, . . . ,pm. Subsequently,
we reduce the dimensionality of the representation towards its intrinsic dimensionality
(EID) as much as possible, such that minimal accuracy is lost, using a deep network
based non-linear mapping (DeepMDS++). Finally, the compressed representation pi is
homomorphically encrypted REnc and passed on to our fast encrypted search algorithm.
approaches are based on cryptographic methods or computer vision techniques.
Cryptographic methods include face detection [2,3] using secure multi-party
computation, image retrieval [44] by oblivious transfer (a building block of secure
multi-party computation), face verification [52] using the Paillier Cryptosystem,
video surveillance [51] using Secret Sharing, learning from private data via
differential privacy [1] and homomorphic encryption [14,57]. Computer vision
techniques include camera localization [46,47] by lifting 2D and 3D points to 2D
and 3D lines, detecting private computer screens [24] using CNNs, and activity
recognition [38,41] through image manipulation. In contrast to the foregoing,
HERS adopts a synergistic combination of computer vision techniques in the
form of dimensionality reduction and cryptographic methods (FHE scheme),
resulting in both efficient and accurate representation matching in the encrypted
domain at scale.
3 Approach
There are essentially two ways to improve search efficiency in the encrypted
domain: (i) the encryption scheme itself can be optimized for faster search,
and (ii) the dimensionality of the representation can be compressed as
far as possible, such that no accuracy is lost. We achieve fast and accurate
search at scale in the encrypted domain by coupling both of these techniques in
HERS (Fig. 2). In the following sections, we elaborate on each of these steps
individually.
3.1 Problem Setup
A typical representation matching task involves a database of m template feature
vectors P = [p1, . . . ,pm] ∈ Rd×m against which a query representation q ∈ Rd
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is matched. The result of the matching process is a score that determines the
degree of similarity between q and each template in P . A common metric that
is adopted in computer vision is the Euclidean distance or the cosine similarity.
At the core, both of these metrics involve matrix-vector products of the form:
r(P , q) = P Tq. Hence, the representation matching process is comprised of md
scalar multiplications and md scalar additions.
We devise a solution to cryptographically guarantee the security of the
database P as well as the query q to prevent leakage of any private infor-
mation. This can be achieved through a parameterized function that trans-
forms a representation z from the original space into an alternate space, i.e.,
E(z) = f(z;θpk), where f(·;θpk) is the encryption function with public-key θpk
and z = g(E(z);θsk), where g(·;θsk) is the decryption function with private-key
θsk. The key idea of our paper is to adopt an encryption function to secure the
database and the query while retaining our ability to compute their matching
score efficiently at scale and without any loss of accuracy i.e.,
r(P , q) ≈ g (r(f(P ,θpk), f(q,θpk));θsk) (1)
FHE satisfies this property and enables us to preserve user privacy. Even
if a malicious attacker can gain access to the database of feature representa-
tions, without access to the private-key θsk the attacker cannot reconstruct the
underlying image or extract any other information inherent to the representation.
3.2 Fast Secure Distance Computation
We use the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) scheme [12] as our base FHE scheme. The
mathematical basis of this scheme lies in modular arithmetic. Building upon this
scheme, we propose a data encoding technique that is tailored for efficient 1 : m
representation matching. We now briefly describe the different components of
our approach.
Fan-Vercauteren Scheme: Plaintext space of the FV scheme is represented as
a polynomial ring over a finite field Rt = Zt[x]/Φn(x), where t ∈ Z is an integer
and Φn(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree at most n− 1. Upon encrypting
the plaintext polynomial, the encrypted numbers (ciphertext) are encoded as
polynomials in the ring Rq. The FV scheme utilizes three keys, (1) a private
decryption key θsk, (2) a public encryption key θpk, and (3) evaluation keys
θev which are necessary for multiplication over encrypted data. Addition and
multiplication of two ciphertexts translates to polynomial addition and dyadic
multiplication in Rq. As long as the coefficients of the resulting polynomials
do not exceed q, correctness is ensured. The exact description of the entire
scheme, including encryption, decryption, ciphertext addition and ciphertext
multiplication, is deferred to Appendix A.
Encoding Scheme: The FV scheme is designed to act on integers only. As such,
we need to encode our real valued representation q ∈ Rd into an integer valued
representation q ∈ Zd. We quantize a given representation’s real-valued features
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into integers with a precision of 0.004 and represent these integers in base w. The
utility of the FV scheme is critically dependent on the encoding scheme chosen
to represent the quantized features in the ring Rt. Therefore, to maintain the
integrity of ciphertext computations, the choice of the ring Rt needs to ensure
that the range of values after the desired ciphertext operations remain within
the same ring.
Our key contribution in this paper is a custom encoding scheme for efficient
1 : m matching by utilizing the SIMD primitives [20] of the FV scheme. The
primitives operate over an array of numbers instead of a single number, encoding
multiple numbers within the same polynomial using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem. The encoding scheme in Boddeti [5] is also based on the same principles
but is specifically suitable for 1 : 1 matching.
Given a query q ∈ Zd and a database of feature vectors P ∈ Zd×m, the encod-
ing scheme in [5] encodes each sample (column) into a polynomial. In contrast,
in HERS, the client node encodes each dimension (row) of the representation
into a polynomial. A query q is encoded into d plaintexts as,
gi =
m∑
j=1
q[i]xj−1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (2)
Similarly, for the database, each dimension of all the templates Pi· ∈ Zm are
encoded into polynomial, resulting in d plaintexts,
hi =
m∑
j=1
pj [i]x
j−1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (3)
In this case, the polynomial which encodes the inner products of the query q and
the templates P can be obtained as,
s =
d∑
i=1
gi ∗ hi =
n∑
j=1
< q,pj > x
j−1 (4)
where the product g ∗ h is standard polynomial multiplication. As a consequence,
the m < n6 inner products can be computed through d polynomial multiplications.
The FV encryption scheme, the corresponding cryptographic primitives, and
ciphertext addition and multiplication, operate on this plaintext representation.
Enrollment Protocol: The client generates a public-private key pair. Given
a template p, the client (i) quantizes the features, (ii) encodes the quantized
template into a plaintext polynomial, (iii) encrypts the plaintext into a ciphertext
using the public key, and (iv) transmits the ciphertext along with metadata of
the template to the server. The server then adds the encrypted query to the
database. Therefore, the server does not have access to the raw representation
of the database at any point. The complete enrollment protocol is described in
Algorithm 6 of the Appendix.
6 When m > n we can chunk the m samples into
⌈
m
n
⌉
databases of n samples each.
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Table 1: Computational Complexity (# of homomorphic operations) of matching a d
dimensional encrypted representation against an encrypted gallery of size m.
Encoding Scheme Multiplication Ratio Addition Ratio Rotation Memory
Na¨ıve md 1 m(d− 1) 1 0 O(mdn)
Boddeti [5] m d m log2 d
d−1
log2 d
m log2 d O(mn)
HERS(ours)
⌈
m
n
⌉
d mdmn e
⌈
m
n
⌉
(d− 1) mdmn e 0 O
(
dn
⌈
m
n
⌉)
Search Protocol: Given a query q, the client (i) quantizes the features, (ii)
encodes the quantized query into a plaintext polynomial, (iii) encrypts the
plaintext into a ciphertext using the private key, and (iv) transmits the ciphertext
to the server. The server computes the encrypted scores as described above and
sends them back to the client. The client now decrypts the encrypted scores
using the private-key and obtains the index of the nearest match. This index
can then be transmitted back to the server depending on the downstream tasks.
Therefore, the server does not have access to the raw representation of the query
or the matching scores at any point. The complete search protocol is described
in Algorithm 7 of the Appendix.
Computational Complexity The key technical barrier to realizing homo-
morphic encryption based representation matching is the computational com-
plexity of the FV scheme, especially ciphertext multiplication. Fundamentally,
the addition/multiplication of two integers in the plaintext transforms to ad-
dition/multiplication of two polynomials of degree n, leading to a n-fold and
O(n2)7-fold increase in computational complexity for addition and multiplication,
respectively. Therefore, mitigating the number of ciphertext multiplications can
lead to large gains in practical utility.
Table 1 compares the computational complexity of different encoding schemes
for secure distance computation. A na¨ıve implementation of the FV scheme, i.e., no
SIMD, encrypts each element of the representation and performs score matching.
Such a scheme has a large computational burden bordering on being impractical
for real-world applications. The 1:1 matching scheme in [5] is specifically designed
for vector-vector inner products by encoding an entire d-dimensional feature
vector into a polynomial. A major computational bottleneck in their scheme is
the need for expensive ciphertext rotations in order to compute the inner product
without access to the individual dimensions of the ciphertext vector. Therefore,
this approach scales linearly with the size of the database m. In contrast, we
observe that our proposed encoding scheme enables HERS to scale to larger
databases due to slower rate of increase in computational complexity by a factor
of ∼ O ( dn).
7 In practice, can be reduced to O(n logn) through number theoretic transforms.
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3.3 Dimensionality Reduction for Faster FHE Matching
From the previous subsection we observe that a smaller feature dimension d
provides a greater computational savings for 1 : m matching in comparison
to existing approaches. Therefore, to further ease the computational burden
of HERS, we reduce the dimensionality of a given representation as much as
possible, while still retaining accuracy (i.e. we attempt to map a representation
from the ambient space to its intrinsic dimensionality8). For example, we show a
reduction of an ImageNet representation from its 1,536-dim ambient space to
a 64-dim space while losing only 1% average precision, but getting a 24 times
search speed up within the encrypted domain.
Recent work [17] has shown that representations learned by deep convolutional
neural networks are highly redundant, i.e., they lie on a low-dimensional manifold
whose intrinsic dimensionality is 20× to 30× smaller than the ambient space that
the representation is embedded in. The authors in [17] further showed that deep
network based non-linear mappings provided a more accurate mapping from a
representation’s ambient space to its intrinsic space than existing dimensionality
reduction techniques. The authors aptly named their dimensionality reduction
technique “DeepMDS”, since DeepMDS follows a similar paradigm as Multidi-
mensional Scaling (MDS) in preserving pairwise distances between the ambient
and intrinsic spaces.
At its core, DeepMDS [17] is a deep network comprised of multiple non-linear
layers, and is trained to project an embedding from its ambient space to the
intrinsic space, such that pairwise distances are preserved. More formally, let
q ∈ Rd be a high-dimensional representation in the ambient space and f(·;w)
be the DeepMDS non-linear mapping function with parameters w. Then, a
representation y in the estimated intrinsic space is computed in accordance with
y = f(x;w)
To train the weightsw in f(·;w), let G1, G2, I1, and I2 be matrices where rows
in each matrix are unit length representations in the ambient space, corresponding
rows in G1 and G2 are two representations extracted from images with the same
class label (genuine pairs), corresponding rows in I1, and I2 are two representations
extracted from images with different class labels (imposter pairs), and N is the
number of rows in the matrices (mini-batch size). Then, each of the rows of these
matrices are projected to the intrinsic space giving four new matrices defined
as Gˆ1, Gˆ2, Iˆ1, and Iˆ2 with a much lower dimensionality (reduced number of
columns).
Next, pairwise distances between genuine pairs DG and imposter pairs DI in
the ambient space and intrinsic space (DˆG, DˆI) are computed as:
DG = u(G1G2
T ) DI = u(I1I2
T ) DˆG = u(Gˆ1Gˆ
T
2 ) DˆI = u(ˆI1Iˆ
T
2 ) (5)
where u(·) returns the diagonal elements of the matrix multiplication.
Finally, the DeepMDS loss is computed in accordance with:
LD = |DG − DˆG|22 + |DI − DˆI |22 (6)
8 Intrinsic dimensionality [17] is the lowest number of dimensions needed to maintain
the information present in the ambient representation.
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Although the authors in [17] showed impressive results in their dimensionality
reduction scheme, it suffers from several limitations which needed to be addressed
in order to use in HERS . First, DeepMDS was mostly trained and tested on
the same dataset, making it vulnerable to overfitting. This is problematic as
we would almost certainly need to train and test on different datasets in real
world applications. Second, the DeepMDS loss is formulated to optimize over
the average pairwise distance deviations in a mini-batch. However, this does not
focus the training towards smaller subsets or modes of representations for which
the embedding is not effective, since they will be averaged out in a randomly
selected mini-batch. Both of these weaknesses manifest themselves downstream
in the form of lower accuracy at lower dimensions, especially as we noticed,
when training and testing on different datasets. Since our application is highly
cognizant of accuracy (we do not want to trade security for accuracy), we propose
DeepMDS++, a deep network based dimensionality reduction technique which
aims to solve the short-comings of DeepMDS.
Covariance Penalty: To help prevent overfitting on cross-dataset evaluations,
in DeepMDS++, we adopt a covariance penalty to encourage features in the
intrinsic space which are less correlated. As was shown in [8], decorrelated features
generalize better than correlated features. More formally, in DeepMDS++, we
compute an additional loss term Lc in accordance with the equation below:
Lc = |C − diag(C)|2F (7)
where C is the covariance matrix computed across our mini-batch [Gˆ1; Gˆ2; Iˆ1; Iˆ2]
and diag(·) returns a diagonal matrix, with diagonal values equivalent to the
input matrix.
Hard Pair Mining: To prevent DeepMDS from overfitting to a mode of repre-
sentations, via its averaging of the pairwise distance deviations in a mini-batch,
we introduce a hard-mining strategy [42] with a specific focus on “harder pairs”
to fill out our mini-batch. In particular, we want to select those pairs for which
the pairwise distance is not well preserved after their mapping into the intrinsic
space. In this way we prevent DeepMDS++ from doing well on the average case,
while ignoring other modes in the data (which seriously effects cross dataset
generalization).
More formally, the mini-batch indices of the hard genuine pairs PG and the
hard imposter pairs PI can be computed as:
PG = argsort(DG − DˆG) PI = argsort(DI − DˆI) (8)
where argsort(·) will return the indices of the rows in matrices Gi and Ii, i ∈
{1, 2} with the highest deviation in pairwise distances following their projection
into the intrinsic space (i.e. the hardest pairs).
In our experimental results (all cross-dataset) we show that the incorporation
of these training techniques into DeepMDS++ aids us in compressing representa-
tions towards their intrinsic dimensionality with lower loss of accuracy, ultimately
enabling us to perform matching in the encrypted domain at much faster speeds.
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4 Experiments
Our experiments are designed to (i) evaluate the improvement in image search
speed with our improved fully homomorphic encryption wrapper, (ii) demonstrate
the further speed improvements following dimensionality reduction, and (iii) show
the improvements of our deep dimensionality reduction method DeepMDS++
over DeepMDS, enabling our compression of representations for faster encrypted
search.
4.1 Implementation Details
DeepMDS++ is implemented in Tensorflow 1.14.0. The network architecture
is provided in Appendix D. We use the Adam optimizer [23] with a starting
learning rate of 3× 10−4 and weight regularization with decay set to 4× 10−5.
We train for 250 epochs, lasting 6 hours, on a NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 Ti
GPU. When using hard-mining, we set the mini-batch size N = 4, 000. At the
start of training, we mine 50 hard genuine pairs and 50 hard imposter pairs which
are augmented with 200 random genuine pairs and 200 random imposter pairs,
respectively. Then, we linearly increase the number of hard genuine and hard
imposter pairs from 50 to 250 over the 250 training epochs.
The implementation of the homomorphic encryption component of HERS
is based on the SEAL library [43]. For all experiments, we used a 10-core Intel
i9-7900X processor running at 3.30 GHz. We use a single-threaded environment.
The three main parameters of the encryption scheme (n, t, q) are set to n = 4, 096,
t = 1, 032, 193 and q is the default value9 in SEAL i.e., a product of 3 very large
primes, each 36 bits long.
4.2 Evaluation Datasets
– ImageNet ILSVRC 2012: 1000 classes with 1.28 million training im-
ages and 50K validation images. We randomly select 100 classes from the
training and validation set for training/testing classification accuracy and
precision/recall, and we use the entire validation set for testing precision @
10.
– FaceScrub + MegaFace [22]: MegaFace: 1 million distractor faces; Face-
Scrub: ≈ 3.5K celebrity faces. These are commonly coupled datasets for
evaluating face search performance at scale.
– CASIA [56]: 450K face images from 10K subjects. 100K subset used to
train DeepMDS++ prior to its application on MegaFace and FaceScrub.
– NIST SD4 [54] + MSP 1.1 Million [58]: NIST SD4: Contains 2,000
probe/mate inked-rolled fingerprint pairs. MSP: privately held forensic
database with over 1.5 million rolled fingerprints (1.1 million used as distrac-
tors; a separate 100K used to train DeepMDS++).
9 In practice, much smaller values of q are sufficient for our purpose.
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Fig. 3: Computational complexity comparison (log-log scale) of HERS with Boddeti [5]
for 1 : m matching as a function of gallery size m and different representation dimen-
sionality.
4.3 Representation Models
– Inception ResNet v2 [48]: Combines inception modules with residual
connections to achieve one of the highest performing results on ImageNet
2012 (Top-1 accuracy 80.3%). We use a pre-trained model10 to extract
ImageNet training and validation features (1,536-dim representations).
– ArcFace [9]: Obtains state-of-the-art results on the MegaFace Challenge
via (i) architectural refinements, (ii) cleaned training data, and (iii) an
additive arc margin loss. We extracted 512-dim embeddings using a publicly
available 11, pre-trained ArcFace model.
– DeepPrint [11]: One of only several DCNNs for extracting deep repre-
sentations from fingerprints (192-dim features for DeepPrint). DeepPrint
matches the accuracy of state-of-the-art commercial matchers via integration
of fingerprint domain knowledge during training.
4.4 Evaluation Protocol and Experimental Results
To evaluate the efficacy of HERS , (i) we benchmark its efficiency at different
gallery sizes and with different representation dimensions against Boddeti [5] , and
(ii) we benchmark the matching and search accuracy at different representation
dimensions against DeepMDS [17].
Efficiency: Figure 3, compares the search speed of the encryption component
of HERS with [5]. We show the speed for 1,536-dim, 512-dim, and 192-dim to
align with the original dimensionality of our different representation models.
10 https://keras.io/applications/#inceptionresnetv2
11 https://github.com/deepinsight/insightface#pretrained-models
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Table 2: Computational Complexity of Search Against 1 Million Gallery
Method
Dimension Time (seconds) Memory (GB)
32 64 128 192 512 1536 32 64 128 192 512 1536
Boddeti [5] 13,825 90
HERS (Ours) 74 148 296 444 1,212 3,635 1.4 2.8 5.5 8.3 22 68
Table 3: ImageNet
(a) Average Precisiona
Dimension DeepMDS DeepMDS++
128 0.92 0.92
64 0.89 0.91
32 0.68 0.88
16 0.37 0.78
a Original AP of 0.92 at 1536-dim
(b) Top-1 Accuracya(%)
Dimension DeepMDS DeepMDS++
128 85.4 85.7
64 83.4 85.0
32 66.1 81.8
16 42.7 71.9
a Original accuracy of 86.2% at 1536-dim
Subsequently, we show the speed up when compressing those representations
to dimensions of 128, 64, or 32. This highlights the importance of combining
encryption techniques together with dimensionality reduction in order to perform
encrypted search at scale. The results indicate that at small gallery sizes 1:1
matching from Boddeti [5] is unsurprisingly more efficient, since it was explicitly
designed for 1:1 matching. However, as the gallery increases HERS is more efficient.
Admittedly these methods are orders of magnitude slower than matching in the
unencrypted domain, but HERS is the first practically scalable search over an
encrypted database. In terms of memory, for a 64-dim representation, HERS
requires 5.9 MB for the probe template and 2.8 GB for a gallery of size 1 million.
In comparison [5] requires less memory for the probe at 19K, but exhausts 90
GB for the same gallery size. Table 2 reports the computational complexity of
encrypted search, in terms of time and memory, against a gallery of 1 Million for
different representation dimensionality.
Accuracy: We evaluate the accuracy of DeepMDS++, the dimensionality re-
duction component of HERS in terms of: (i) Top-1 classification accuracy and
Precision-Recall curves from a subset of 100 classes of the ImageNet validation
set, (ii) Precision @ 10 (Precision in Top-10 retrieved samples) using the entire
ImageNet validation set, (iii) Rank-1 Face Search Performance on MegaFace
(1 million distractors), and (iv) Rank-1 Fingerprint Search performance (using
NIST SD4 against a gallery of 1.1 million [58]). For classification experiments
on ImageNet, we train a Linear SVM classifier (one-vs-rest) on top of our em-
beddings. To compute Precision @ 10, we randomly select 10 probes from each
validation class, and use the remaining 40 from each class as mates. These mates
are combined with the remaining 45, 000 distractors with 900 classes and 50
images / class.
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Fig. 4: Precision-Recall curves using Inception ResNet V2 on ImageNet 2012
Table 4: Face and Fingerprint Search: Rank-1 Accuracy (%)
(a) MegaFace (Gallery: 1 Million)
512-dim 256-dim 128-dim 64-dim
81.4 81.4 78.8 66.2
(b) Fingerprint (Gallery: 1.1 Million)
192-dim 64-dim 32-dim 16-dim
94.5 94.2 94.0 87.5
Table 3a and Table 3b compares the performance of DeepMDS++ and
DeepMDS on the ImageNet dataset for the task of image retrieval and image
classification, respectively. Figure 4 shows the full precision recall curves at
dimensions 1536, 64, 32 and 16 for Inception ResNet v2 embeddings. The results
indicate that,
– It is feasible to compress the image representations by large factors for a small
performance penalty. For instance, the representation can be compressed by
a factor of 24× (1536-dim to 64-dim) for a performance loss of 1% (92% to
91%) in AP and 1% (86.2% to 85.0%) Top-1 accuracy or by a factor of 48×
(1536-dim to 32-dim) for a performance loss of 4% (92% to 88%) in AP and
4.5% (86.2% to 81.8%) in Top-1 accuracy.
– Representations compressed through DeepMDS++ are able to retain more
discriminative information at lower dimensions compared to DeepMDS, es-
pecially at lower dimensions. For instance, at 32-dim DeepMDS++ obtains
an average precision of 88% compared to 68% by DeepMDS for image re-
trieval. Similarly DeepMDS++ Top-1 image classification accuracy is 81.8%
compared to 66.1% for DeepMDS.
– From the precision recall curves, we note that as the Inception ResNet
v2 ambient embeddings are compressed to a lower number of dimensions,
DeepMDS++ has an increasing advantage over the original DeepMDS [17].
Table 4a and Table 4b show the Rank-1 accuracy of encrypted face (MegaFace
[22]) and fingerprint (MSP [58]) search, respectively, as we compress the represen-
tations with DeepMDS++. These results suggest that, practically speaking, we
can compress the face representations by a factor of 4× (512-dim to 128-dim) for
a performance loss of 2.6% (81.4% to 78.8%). Similarly fingerprint representations
can be compressed by a factor of 6× (192-dim to 32-dim) for a performance
loss of 0.5% (94.5% to 94.0%). The degree of compression of the representation
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Table 5: Precision @ Rank 10 on ImageNet ILSVRC-2012 Validation Set (%)
Dimensionality1
DeepMDS++
(proposed)
w/o Hard Mining
w/o Lc
w/o Hard Mining
(DeepMDS [17])
256 67.6 66.1 66.1
128 66.5 64.1 64.3
64 64.0 60.1 58.9
32 57.6 43.6 36.4
16 38.0 17.0 17.1
1 Performance with original 1536-dim Inception ResNet V2 features is 69.7%.
by DeepMDS++ closely mirrors the intrinsic dimensionality estimates12 of the
respective representations. The intrinsic dimensionalities of ArcFace, DeepPrint
and Inception ResNet V2 are 15, 5 and 6 respectively, suggesting that unfolding
ArcFace down to 16-dim is about three times as hard as compressing the latter
two representations.
Ablation: Table 5 shows the impact of hard-pair mining and the covariance loss
on the ability of DeepMDS to compress the representations. We observe that
hard-pair mining is effective across all dimensions while the covariance loss is
more effective around 32 to 64 dimensions where a noticeable benefit is observed.
The ability of DeepMDS++ to retain more discriminative information than
DeepMDS affords compression to lower dimensions which in turn synergistically
aids in improving the efficiency of encrypted search.
5 Discussion
Here we briefly comment on our choice of cryptographic solution, namely, FHE,
the limitations induced by our choice and contrast it with other plausible cryp-
tographic solutions. Two other alternative cryptographic solutions that can be
employed in lieu of or in conjunction with FHE are:
Partial Homomorphic Encryption (Paillier Cryptosystem [34]): This
scheme supports only homomorphic additions and is significantly more efficient
for scalars than the FV scheme we use. However, it does not support massively
vectorized SIMD operations, which is the key source of efficiency in HERS .
Secure Multi-Party Computation [15]: This scheme can be employed to
securely compute the nearest neighbors (including matching score and argmax
index) by employing multiple parties that communicate secret shares with each
other in such a way that no single party can access all the features. This approach
trades-off low computation for high communication costs. Furthermore, it requires
that the database be split among multiple parties which may not be desirable in
some applications. In contrast, the FHE scheme trades-off low-communication
12 ID estimate code: https://github.com/human-analysis/intrinsic-dimensionality
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costs for high computational costs. The main drawback of the FV scheme is the
limited arithmetic operations supported by it, namely addition and multiplica-
tion. Therefore, computing non-linear functions like max and argmax are not
supported by HERS . In the context of search, as opposed to 1:1 verification, it
is often sufficient to protect the gallery and query representations, as opposed
to the matching scores. In such cases, our solution of computing the matching
scores in the encrypted domain, having the client decrypt the scores and finally
having the server respond with the matched database index should suffice.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed HERS , a scheme for accurate and practical search
over homomorphically encrypted representations at scale. The efficiency of HERS
stems from (i) efficient cryptographic primitives for encrypted matrix-vector
products, and (ii) DeepMDS++, a non-linear dimensionality reduction technique
to reduce operations in the encrypted domain. The accuracy of HERS stems
from (i) the exact computations of our cryptographic primitive, and (ii) the
effectiveness of DeepMDS++ in maintaining matching performance at large
compression factors. Our experimental results demonstrate, for the first time,
practical (under 5 minutes) and accurate (within ≈ 2% of unencrypted accuracy)
image search (for face, fingerprint and ImageNet) against 1 Million gallery in the
encrypted domain.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we include, (a) details of the base homomorphic encryption
scheme [12] in Section A, (b) detailed algorithms for the enrollment and search
phase of HERS in Section B, (c) security analysis of HERS in Section C, and (d)
architectural details of DeepMDS++ in Section D.
A Fully Homomorphic Encryption
For completeness, we describe the Fan-Vercauteren [12] scheme and the associated
homomorphic operations, i.e., ciphertext addition and multiplication. These
operations will be used in the enrollment and search phase of HERS .
Mathematical Notation: For t ∈ Z a ring Rt = Zt[x]/(xn + 1) represents
polynomials of degree less than n with the coefficients modulo t. The operators
b·c, d·e and b·e denote rounding down, up and to the nearest integer respectively.
The operator [·] denotes the reduction of an integer by modulo t, where the
reductions are performed on the symmetric interval [−t/2, t/2). The operators
when applied to a polynomial are assumed to act independently on the coefficients
of the polynomial. a
$←− S denotes that a is sampled uniformly from the finite
set S. Similarly, a ←− χ denotes that a is sampled from a discrete truncated
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Gaussian. We note the plaintext polynomial (also called message) as m and the
ciphertext polynomial as ct.
Fan-Vercauteren Scheme [12]: The FV scheme encodes integers to polyno-
mials in a ring Rt (see Eq.2 and Eq.3 for our encoding), referred to as plaintext.
Given such a polynomial plaintext, the FV scheme defines the encryption and de-
cryption protocols for such polynomials. The ciphertext is encoded as polynomials
in a different ring Rq.
Let λ be the desired level of security, w the base to represent numbers in,
and l = blogw qc the number of terms in the decomposition of q into base w.
Below are the details of the FV scheme in terms of key generation, encryption,
decryption, addition and multiplication over encrypted integers.
Algorithm 1 Key Generation
1: procedure GetKeys(λ, l, w, q)
2: Sample: θsk
$←− R2 . private (secret) key
3: Sample: a
$←− Rq and e←− χ
4: θpk = ([−(aθsk + e)]q,a) . public key
5: θev = ∅
6: for i = 1 to l do . generate evaluation keys
7: Sample: ai
$←− Rq, ei ←− χ
8: θiev = ([−(aiθsk + ei) + wiθ2sk]q,ai)
9: θev = θev ∪ {θiev}
10: end for
11: return θpk, θsk, θev . return all the keys
12: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Encryption
1: procedure Encrypt(m, θpk, q, t)
2: Sample: u
$←− R2, e1 ←− χ and e2 ←− χ
3: ∆ = b q
t
c
4: ct = ([∆m+ θpk[0]u+ e1]q, [θpk[1]u+ e2]q) = (ct[0], ct[1])
5: return ct
6: end procedure
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Algorithm 3 Decryption
1: procedure Decrypt(ct, θsk, q, t)
2: pt =
[⌊
t
q
[ct[0] + ct[1]θsk]q
⌉]
t
3: return pt
4: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Ciphertext Addition
1: procedure CipherAdd(ct0, ct1, q)
2: ot = ([ct0[0] + ct1[0]]q, [ct0[1] + ct1[1]]q)
3: return ot
4: end procedure
Algorithm 5 Ciphertext Multiplication
1: procedure CipherMultiply(ct0, ct1, w, l, q, t)
2: c0 =
[⌊
t
q
(ct0[0]ct1[0])
⌉]
q
3: c1 =
[⌊
t
q
(ct0[0]ct1[1] + ct0[1]ct1[0])
⌉]
q
4: c2 =
[⌊
t
q
(ct0[1]ct1[1])
⌉]
q
5: c2 =
∑l
i=0 c
(i)
2 w
i and compute
6: c′0 = c0 +
∑l
i=1 θev[i][0]c
(i)
2
7: c′1 = c1 +
∑l
i=1 θev[i][1]c
(i)
2
8: return (c′0, c
′
1)
9: end procedure
B Protocols
Here we describe the detailed algorithms of the two phases in HERS , namely,
enrollment (Algorithm 6) and search (Algorithm 7). Both of these algorithms
are built upon the cryptographic primitives described in Section A.
B.1 Enrollment
Algorithm 6 describes our entire enrollment procedure. The algorithm is designed
to handle the scenario where the number of samples in the database m is larger
than the ring dimension n (degree of the polynomial). The algorithm also considers
a more practical scenario of online enrollment, i.e., we may wish to enroll one
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gallery feature vector at a time to the encrypted database. For this purpose,
we first encrypt an all-zero feature representation and update it with each new
gallery we wish to enroll. This is implemented in Lines 12 - 22 of Algorithm 6
below.
Algorithm 6 HERS Enrollment
1: Encryption Parameters: coefficient bit length bc, plaintext modulus t,
ciphertext modulus q, ring dimension n
2: Server initializes empty database Di ← ∅ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, label set I ← ∅
and database index k = 0, v = 0
3: θpk, θsk, θev = GetKeys(λ, l, w, q) . client generates keys
4: Inputs: id ∈ Nm and q ∈ Rd×m . m feature vectors of dimension d each
5: for i = 1 to d do
6: v ← k mod n
7: m← BatchEncode(qi·; v) . i-th dim to v-th index of plaintext
8: cti = Encrypt(m;θpk,q,t)
9: end for
10: k ← k +m . increment database index
11: Send ({ct1, . . . , ctd}, id) to the server
. enrollment at server
12: I ← I ∪ {id}
13: v˜ ← ⌈ k
n
⌉
14: if v˜ > v then
15: D ← D ∪ {r1, . . . , rd}
16: v ← v˜
17: ri ← Encrypt(0;θpk,q,t) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} . initialize all zero ciphertext
18: else
19: for i = 1 to d do . enrollment at server
20: ri ← CipherAdd(ri, cti;q)
21: end for
22: end if
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Algorithm 7 HERS Search
1: Inputs: q ∈ Rd, I, D, database index k, ring dimension n . unencrypted
query and encrypted database
. authentication at client
2: for i = 1 to d do
3: m← BatchEncode(qi·; 0) . i-th dim to all indices of plaintext
4: cti = Encrypt(m;θpk,q,t)
5: end for
6: Send ({ct1, . . . , ctd}) to the server
. authentication at server
7: S ← ∅
8: for v = 1 to
⌈
k
n
⌉
do
9: s← Encrypt(0;θpk,q,t) . initialize all zero score ciphertext
10: for i = 1 to d do
11: p← CipherMultiply(cti,Dvi ;w,l,q,t)
12: s← CipherAdd(s,p;q)
13: end for
14: S ← S ∪ {s}
15: end for
16: Send encrypted scores S back to client
. authentication at client
17: R← ∅
18: for l = 1 to
⌈
k
n
⌉
do
19: r ← Decrypt(Sl;θsk,q,t)
20: R← R∪ {r}
21: end for
22: nearest neighbhor← arg maxR
B.2 Search
Algorithm 7 describes our entire search procedure. This includes, query encryption,
encrypted score computation, score decryption and argmax on the decrypted
scores to find the nearest match.
C Security Analysis
We adopt common assumptions in cryptography, i.e., the entities in our system
(client and server) are semi-honest - each entity “follows the protocol properly
with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations”[33].
Under these assumptions, the security of HERS is built upon the security of
the FV scheme, which in turn is based in the hardness of the Ring Learning
with Errors problem [28]. Practically, this means that the security of our entire
protocol hinges upon the fact that the ciphertext cannot be decrypted without
access to the private (secret) decryption key which resides only on the client. The
24 Joshua J. Engelsma, Anil K. Jain, and Vishnu Naresh Boddeti
encryption parameters (n, t, q) chosen by our experiments correspond to 128-bits
of security.
The HERS system has three sources of vulnerability to attackers, namely,
(1) the client device which holds the secret keys, (2) the communication channel
between the client and server, and (3) the database which holds the encrypted
representations and performs score computation in the encrypted domain. The
physical and digital security of the client is most important in order to protect
the secret keys. The security of the communication channel and the database
server are guaranteed by the security of the FV scheme itself.
D DeepMDS++
DeepMDS++ is comprised of repeating block units. A single block unit structure
is shown in Table 6 and is comprised of two fully-connected layers.
Table 6: DeepMDS++ Block Unit (BUi) Architecture
Layer Type Input Dimensions Output Dimensions
Fully Connected
(Relu Activation)
ID
1 ID
Fully Connected
(No Activation)
ID OD
2
1 ID: Input dimension of current block unit.
2 OD: Output dimension of current block unit.
The number of block units in a given DeepMDS++ model varies, depending
on the dimensionality of the original ambient space and the final intrinsic (or
as close as possible to intrinsic without losing accuracy) space. The specific
repeating block unit structures for the three representation models utilized in
this paper are shown (assuming the lowest output dimension reported for each
model in the paper) in Table 7 (Inception ResNet v2), Table 8 (ArcFace), and
Table 9 (DeepPrint). When we report results for each of these three DeepMDS++
models at higher dimensions in the paper, we simply discard later block units
and retrain. In all of our comparisons with the original DeepMDS [17], we utilize
the same repeating block unit architectures for the DeepMDS baseline.
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Table 7: DeepMDS++ (Inception ResNet v2)
Block Unit
Block Input
Dimensions (ID)
Block Output
Dimensions (OD)
BU1 1,536 1,024
BU2 1,024 512
BU3 512 256
BU4 256 128
BU5 128 64
BU6 64 32
BU7 32 16
Table 8: DeepMDS++ (ArcFace)
Block Unit
Block Input
Dimensions (ID)
Block Output
Dimensions (OD)
BU1 512 256
BU2 256 128
BU3 128 64
Table 9: DeepMDS++ (DeepPrint)
Block Unit
Block Input
Dimensions (ID)
Block Output
Dimensions (OD)
BU1 192 128
BU2 128 64
BU3 64 32
BU4 32 16
